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Party Institutionalisation in the Czech 
Republic: Towards a New Measurement 
of  the Theoretical Concept1 
 
JAKUB STAUBER2 
Abstract: The overall stability of the party system is usually studied on the basis of system-level 
aggregates such as electoral volatility or the effective number of political parties. Such an approach 
can be problematic, because it primarily measures just one dimension of stability, which is defined 
as the stability of electoral support. The article argues that this external dimension of stability should 
be further analysed in the context of the development of intra-party structures. The institutionalisation 
theory includes both dimensions, so it is capable of interpreting complex relations between them. Based 
on empirical data, the article systematically compares nine relevant political parties in the Czech 
Republic to better understand differences in the stabilisation of different types of party organisations 
in the context of party system changes in recent years. 
Keywords: Institutionalisation; Political Parties; Czech Republic; Newness; Organisational 
Stability 
 
1. Introduction 
The Czech party system was considered relatively stable in the region of East 
Central Europe. However, since the general election in 2010, it has been possible 
to observe the growing importance of genuinely new political parties and 
movements in terms of electoral gains and their presence in governmental 
coalitions. As can be seen in Table 1, after a certain movement towards 
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stabilisation, the Czech party system has become more volatile and fragmented. 
The impact of newcomers such as Public Affairs (VV) and ANO 2011 (ANO) 
was demonstrated by the fact that both actors achieved representation in 
government in 2010 and 2013, respectively. Such developments have 
predominantly been analysed on the level of the party system by using 
comparative indicators such as aggregated volatility and decreasing party 
membership, or in the context of increasing distrust in political parties as such 
(Šedo 2011; Linek 2014). However, very little is known about differences between 
the institutional characteristics of new and established political parties and about 
the different strategies used by political parties in general to ensure persistence 
in nationwide party politics. In other words, how are Czech political parties 
institutionalised in the context of a de-institutionalising party system? 
 
Table 1: Aggregated Indicators of Stabilisation of the Czech Party System 
Year 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 
Electoral 
turnout (%) 
76.41 74.03 58.00 64.47 62.60 59.48 
Volatility* - 18.12 16.05 18.53 35.31 36.93 
ENP** 5.33 4.72 4.82 3.91 6.75 7.63 
Source: Author’s own calculations; Data: Český statistický úřad (2015) 
* Pedersen index of aggregated electoral volatility 
** Effective number of legislative parties 
Note: Pedersen index is calculated from total net changes in electoral gains of all parties 
participated in general election.  
 
Using empirical data, the article compares nine Czech political parties, namely 
the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS), the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party 
(KDU-ČSL), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), 
TOP 09, Public Affairs (VV), ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy (ÚSVIT), and 
the Green Party (SZ), to examine the extent to which political parties established 
themselves as stable institutions in terms of internal and external characteristics. 
The analysis also describes the main differences between newly established parties 
and those with a longer tradition or rather a more stable position in the party 
system, because initial success has far reaching consequences for the development 
of the internal organisational structure of new political parties. New parties are 
eligible for additional funding from public budgets and become accepted as a part 
of the party system by established political actors and institutions. Electoral 
success is very often connected with the personalised leadership of a political 
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entrepreneur. These new trends also influence the established parties, which 
are required to react to new challenges. The article focuses only on political parties 
with a parliamentary presence, because of the easier possibility of comparing cases 
that fulfil a wide range of functions of political parties and, given their 
parliamentary presence, operate on a higher level of complexity. The period 
between 2006 and 2013 was chosen because it constitutes a specific situation 
highly interesting from the point of view of institutionalisation theory; 
that is, it encapsulated changes in electoral behaviour that resulted in greater 
support for new political parties and movements and the subsequent responses 
of established actors. 
Beside the analysis of selected empirical cases, the article’s goal is to further 
develop scientific discussion on the possibility of using institutionalisation theory 
as a tool for the analysis of political parties. The most problematic part 
of applying the concept can be identified in its operationalisation, because there 
is no one set of operational criteria accepted among scholars. The approaches 
not only differ in selected criteria and levels of analysis, but Levitsky (1998) even 
argues that the whole concept of party institutionalisation should be disintegrated 
and every dimension should be analysed separately. Unfortunately, Levitsky does 
not offer empirical evidence for his claim or even the criteria necessary to decide 
whether it is possible to measure institutionalisation in terms of one single value. 
To respond to Levitsky’s argument, this article tests a new composite indicator 
based on the assumption of conceptual multidimensionality. Thus, every 
dimension is first evaluated separately in order to describe differences among 
the organisational forms of political parties and then the performance 
and limitations of the composite indicator are evaluated. Despite the fact that the 
article analyses a relatively small number of empirical cases, its construction 
is especially useful when it is necessary to observe differences among different 
political parties and changes in time. This fact combined with conceptual 
multidimensionality results in the necessity to develop a more systematic approach 
to comparison. Thus, the study operates on the “party-electoral year” level 
of analysis, which means a comparison of 20 unique cases in the context of three 
dimensions. Under these conditions, the construction of a composite indicator 
seems to be reasonable solution. 
The general theoretical framework for comparison is based 
on institutionalisation theory applied to the internal organisations of political 
parties – in particular, on the approach suggested by Randall and Svåsand 
(2002, to be explained in the following section). For the operationalisation 
of the theoretical concept, a new Political Party Institutionalisation Index 
is developed. This index is based on indicators defined in scientific discussion 
on political parties and includes indicators connected with the abovementioned 
dimensions (e.g. the number of alternations, party membership, multisource 
funding, or electoral stability). 
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2. Institutionalisation Theory 
Originally, the process of institutionalisation was analysed in the sociology 
of organisations, namely in its sub-field of structural functionalism. From 
the functionalist perspective, Talcott Parsons defined institutions as certain 
patterns which are characterised by the fact that certain behaviours of persons 
performing structurally important roles in the social system can be legitimately 
expected by other social actors (Parsons 1954: 239). Regarding the process 
of institutionalisation, Philip Selznick (1984: 5–6) differentiates between 
organisation and institution. While an organisation usually serves as an expendable 
tool created for a particular goal, an institution is rather characterised 
by the “concern for self-maintenance” (Selznick 1984: 20). 
In the field of political science, the concept of institutionalisation has been 
used in variety of studies including the analysis of democratic transitions 
(Huntington 1968), authoritative regimes (Levitsky 1998), and political parties 
or party systems (Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Kouba 
2007; Tomsa 2008; Casal Bértoa 2012; Croissant and Völkel 2012). 
For the particular context of the institutionalisation of new political parties, 
see Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999; Jarmara, 2011; Mierzejewski-Voznyak, 2013; 
and Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2014. 
Probably the best known definition of party institutionalisation 
was formulated by Angelo Panebianco (1988). He further developed 
Selznick’s concept and stated that “[i]nstitutionalisation is, in fact, the process 
by which an organisation incorporates its founders’ values and aims. […] The 
organisation slowly loses its character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and 
of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it” 
(Panebianco 1988: 53). To measure the degree of institutionalisation, Panebianco 
suggests five indicators, namely the development of a central bureaucracy, 
the homogeneity of organisational structures, the plurality of financial sources, 
the character of relations with collateral organisations, and correspondence 
between de iure and de facto internal power structurs. As can be seen, Panebianco 
uses the term in the context of intra-party relations. Nevertheless, 
institutionalisation can be perceived in a broader perspective as the ability 
of a political party to establish itself as rooted in society. This notion is particularly 
prominent in Janda’s definition, where “an institutionalised party is one that 
is reified in the public mind so that ‘the party’ exists as a social organisation apart 
from its momentary leaders” (Janda 1980: 19). 
As can be seen, both definitions stress different aspects of institutionalisation. 
While Panebianco’s definition points to organisational characteristics, Janda 
emphasises the importance of rootedness in society. In recent approaches towards 
party institutionalisation, these dimensions are equally important (see Randall and 
Svåsand 2002; Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2013; Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). 
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It is possible to identify more definitions of institutionalisation in scientific 
literature, and Levitsky (1998) even argues that some authors tend to mix several 
distinct phenomena into one concept. Levitsky especially disagrees with using 
institutionalisation as a single indicator or variable in the framework of causal 
analysis. Levitsky then concludes: “Rather than lump together several different 
dimensions into a single concept, it may be more fruitful to break the concept 
down into its component meanings and to use more specific terms” 
(Levitsky 1998: 88).  
To respond to this substantive critique, every measure consisting of more 
than one dimension that is applied in the analysis of party institutionalisation 
should be controlled in terms of reliability by means of psychometric tests, such 
as Crombach’s Alpha. Reliability testing is able to respond to the degree to which 
the phenomenon measured by a composite indicator is unidirectional. Although 
such standards are not so widespread in scientific literature on party 
institutionalisation, at least one example can be pointed out. Casal Bértoa 
(2014: 18) developed a composite indicator measuring party system 
institutionalisation and also used this reliability testing procedure with success. 
This would partially contradict Levitsky’s (1998) argument and suggest that 
institutionalisation is applicable as a single concept, even at the level of political 
parties. 
Nicolle Bolleyer (2013) formulated another critical argument when 
she pointed out the fact that successful institutionalisation is sometimes 
considered synonymous with building large extra-parliamentary organisational 
structures. Nevertheless, in some cases, this view can be wrong. Bolleyer argues 
that so-called organisation-based institutionalisation is not an exclusive pathway, 
as leadership-oriented institutionalisation is able to reach the same result. Bolleyer 
defines the distinction between these two types of institutionalisation 
as a difference in loyalty structure, i.e. the loyalty of members is derived through 
attachment to the leader or to a certain set of core values, instead of through 
building a large extra-parliamentary organisation. On the other hand, Bolleyer 
admits that the latter has some advantages; primarily, a larger extra-parliamentary 
structure can stabilise a political party against potential organisational shocks 
(e.g. a leadership vacuum or electoral decline). A network of local branches 
can also strengthen recruitment capacity as it is able to preselect particular types 
of candidates. 
As Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand (2002) suggest, institutionalisation should 
be perceived as a multidimensional concept which is not only connected with 
the development of formal organisational structures but also with the 
construction of a specific attitude or identity. Furthermore, organisations become 
institutionalised in two other aspects, namely internal and external ones. 
The internal aspect refers to the development of intra-party structures, while the 
external aspect is understood as the sum of relations between the political party 
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and its social surroundings (e.g. another political parties, political institutions, 
voters, etc.). The authors cited above defined four dimensions 
of institutionalisation: 1) systemness, 2) value infusion, 3) decisional autonomy 
and 4) reification (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Dimensions of Party Institutionalisation 
 Internal External 
Structural Systemness Decisional autonomy 
Attitudinal Value infusion Reification 
Source: Randall and Svåsand (2002: 13) 
Systemness is defined as an internal aspect of the structural dimension 
and refers to the increasing routinisation and development of stable conventions 
in the internal party structure. The term value infusion explains the ability 
of a political party to create its distinctive culture or identity among its members 
and supporters. The fundamental question in this concept is whether 
the identification of members with a political party transcends their self-interested 
motivations for involvement.  
The impact of autonomy, an external aspect of the structural dimension, 
on party institutionalisation can be seen from various perspectives. According 
to Randall and Svåsand, it is important to analyse and evaluate the form 
of interdependence. In general, the absence of an external sponsoring institution 
indicates a higher degree of institutionalisation. Nevertheless, in some cases 
(e.g. the linkage of socialist parties to trade unions), interdependence could have 
positive consequences towards strengthening the adaptability of a political party 
to the changing societal context. As a possible solution to this dilemma, Randall 
and Svåsand suggest that an institutionalised party should at least have 
a significant degree of decisional autonomy in the formulation its policies (Randall 
and Svåsand 2002: 14). 
Finally, the fourth category is defined as an external aspect of the attitudinal 
dimension. The reification refers to the extent to which a political party 
is accepted by other political actors, either individuals or institutions, 
as a legitimate part of the political system. 
Based on a review of theoretical literature, the article by Randall and Svåsand 
proposes a complex conceptual framework which can be used as a basis for 
further research. Unfortunately, being written mainly from the perspective 
of qualitative methodology, the article lacks a set of operational criteria suitable 
for reproducible analysis, thus empirical indicators need to be operationalised 
separately. For a more rigorous operationalisation of party institutionalisation, 
it would therefore be necessary to derive measures from recently published 
articles on the topic, but with several corrections resulting from adopting party 
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organisation as the level of analysis (see the discussion in the chapter on 
Conceptualisation and Operationalisation below). 
The theoretical chapter presents seminal approaches to party 
institutionalisation. So far, two broad dimensions of institutionalisation have been 
outlined, i.e. organisational characteristics and rootedness in society. Recent 
theoretical discussion adds new criteria based on the necessity to analyze less 
formal functional aspects of party organisations, which are mainly presented 
as the ability to generate and sustain a distinct culture or identity. The analysis also 
adopts the theoretical assumption by Bolleyer (2013) that according to party 
organisation type, the strategies leading to institutionalisation can be substantially 
different. This means every dimension of institutionalisation should be weighted 
equally and that the analysis has to emphasise their different configurations. 
 
3. Conceptualisation and Operationalisation 
The operationalisation of political party institutionalisation presents the most 
problematic aspect of the analysis. On the basis of the literature review, we can 
conclude that there is no unified or commonly accepted analytical framework 
which could simply be transferred and used to explain the phenomenon of party 
institutionalisation in another country or region. Authors usually tend to measure 
some country-specific variables or focus only on certain organisational types 
of political parties (see Basedau and Stroh 2008, Tomsa 2008, Yardımcı-Geyikçi 
2013; Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). 
Firstly, it is necessary to clarify the level of analysis, because there are two 
basic themes in the application of institutionalisation theory in political party 
research, i.e. party institutionalisation and party system institutionalisation. 
In general, party system institutionalisation refers to regularity in the patterns 
of competition and cooperation among different political parties. Among recent 
contributions to this topic is the book Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries 
by Meleshevich (2007). Meleshevich’s contribution to the application 
of institutionalisation is a proper definition of operational indicators measuring 
selected theoretical concept. The author suggests five indicators of party system 
institutionalisation: 1) the number of independent deputies in parliament, 
2) the participation of parties in the formation of a cabinet, 3) geographical 
patterns of voting, 4) the percentage of votes taken by “old” parties, 
and 5) the Pedersen index of electoral volatility (Meleshevich 2007: 27). Party 
system institutionalisation in East Central Europe has been further researched 
in Casal Bértoa, 2012 and 2014.  
In contrast, party institutionalisation research focuses on a single political 
party from the perspective of its stability and change, not only in the sense of its 
formal characteristics, but also in its ability to establish specific roots in society. 
The present article approaches the issue from this second perspective, i.e. party 
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institutionalisation. As was pointed out in the introduction, party 
institutionalisation lacks a coherent set of operational criteria; thus, a new 
analytical framework will be suggested in the following discussion. 
As a starting point for a more general approach, the operationalisation 
suggested by Kenneth Janda (1980) could be utilised. Janda systematically 
collected data on political parties across different countries and regions. 
In the context of institutionalisation, the author defines several quantifiable 
variables by which he predominantly aims to measure symptoms of organisational 
instability or continuity. Janda accepts Huntington’s definition: 
"Institutionalisation is the process by which organisations and procedures acquire 
value and stability" (Janda 1980: 19). On the basis of this definition, 
he operationalises institutionalisation with six variables: year of origin, name 
changes, organisational discontinuity, leadership completion, legislative instability, 
and electoral instability. The composition of variables aims to describe the 
concept in terms of internal and external dimensions. However, Janda does not 
include variables related to organisational autonomy, because he points out that 
the degree of party institutionalisation can be relatively high although a party lacks 
full autonomy (e.g. the Labour Party in Great Britain). This is probably more 
of a terminological problem, because different authors tend to stress different 
aspects of autonomous political organisation. Therefore, it is necessary to define 
a concrete notion of autonomy. As Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014: 935) 
put it: “[…] institutionalised parties are organisationally autonomous; they should 
not be dependent for their existence on, or dictated to by, the leadership and/or 
an extra-parliamentary organisation; and they should exist as an independent 
entity in the minds of the public.” 
As can be seen, there is no commonly accepted analytical framework 
measuring the degree of institutionalisation. Probably, the most significant 
obstacle to using the concept in comparatively oriented research 
is its multidimensionality. There are two possible solutions. The first 
is to compare cases on the basis of variables as such and then summarise 
different aspects of party institutionalisation. This approach can be especially 
useful for the analysis of a small number of cases (see Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2013; 
Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). Yardımcı-Geyikçi divides the concept into 
two categories: organisational development and roots in society. The first category 
is operationalised on the basis of membership strength, territorial 
comprehensiveness, and financial resources. The second category is indicated 
by the electoral volatility of individual parties, party identification, and public 
legitimacy. Even though variables are defined and operationalised 
rigorously, the research design does not include any data normalisation 
technique and the data are compared by means of single variables rather than 
in a broader conceptual context. Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen employ an even 
more complex design in which they analyse institutionalisation on different 
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organisational levels, namely the electoral party level, the internal party level, 
and the legislative party level.  
The second approach, which is more suitable for a larger number of cases, 
could be to construct a composite indicator integrating directly measurable 
variables into a scheme which would enable the conceptual complexity 
to be simplified. Probably the most complex conceptualisation of political party 
institutionalisation is formulated in a working paper by Basedau and Stroh (2008) 
in which the authors compose an index of four dimensions and a combination 
of 15 quantitative and qualitative variables. As a technique for the normalisation 
of data they use categorical scaling, so measured values are recoded into several 
categories regarding a given threshold. It should also be noted that 
the conceptualisation cannot be simply applied in more general comparative 
designs, because it includes several variables specific to party institutionalisation 
in developing countries.3 The potentially problematic part of the conceptualisation 
could be the classification of qualitative data, especially when no additional pieces 
of information about the processes of collection and interpretation are specified. 
Regarding the preceding discussion, the index should reflect several 
assumptions. It should primarily consider that the process of institutionalisation 
consists of more dimensions which can affect the degree of institutionalisation 
in specific ways. The composition of variables should further operate with the 
presumption that institutionalisation is influenced by relations on different 
organisational levels. For the selection of variables, it is also necessary to avoid 
the “unit-jump fallacy”; thus, the level of analysis is set to political parties and not 
to the aggregated level of the party system. Practically, the index should 
be developed more as a comparative indicator which would be able not only 
to categorise political parties on the basis of presented theoretical presumptions, 
but also to identify specific patterns, i.e. combinations of dimensions, which are 
used by political parties to be more persistent in the party system. The next 
important aspect is how institutionalisation changes over time, because it is not 
an irreversible process and a political party can potentially face  
de-institutionalisation. Thus, it has to be emphasised that the calculated values of 
the index refer only to specific periods. 
The first problem is the selection of criteria. Although a clear consensus 
among scholars is missing, the seminal studies introduced in this chapter are 
connected by the argument that institutionalisation de facto consists of two broader 
phenomena. The first is institutionalisation perceived as organisational stability, 
which usually deals with longevity, the development of official organisational 
structures, and de-personalisation. This phenomenon is often researched under 
different terminology, e.g. Levitsky (1998) suggests the term behavioural routinisation, 
                                                 
3 Party age is used in two variables on the one hand relative to country independence and on the 
other hand relative to reintroduction of multiparty system. 
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but Yardımcı-Geyikçi (2013: 4) refers to organisational development. For the purposes 
of this article, the terminology developed by Randall and Svåsand (2002) 
is adopted because of its conceptual clarity. Thus, the organisational dimension 
is called systemness. The second dimension analyses different aspects 
of institutionalisation which are focused on a party’s ability to develop and sustain 
stable roots in society (Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2013) or, as Randall and Svåsand (2002) put 
it, reification. The lack of consensus is then clearly observable in the question 
of whether further conceptual dimensions should be added. Levitsky (1998) and 
Randall and Svåsand (2002) suggest the dimension of value infusion. Value infusion 
is especially important, because it covers organisational aspects in the sense 
of building a distinct internal culture and identity among party supporters. The 
separate operationalisation of value infusion then brings benefits in terms of the 
possibility to analyse certain new types of political parties that rely more 
on building a community of supporters than on a formalised organisational 
structure.  
The last widely discussed topic is the role of autonomy in the process 
of institutionalisation. As Panebianco (1988: 55) put it: “A position of autonomy 
is reached when the organisation can directly control exchange processes with 
its environment. An organisation is, on the other hand, dependent when 
its indispensable resources are in part controlled by other organisations.” Janda 
(1980), on the other hand, rejects autonomy as a separate dimension 
of institutionalisation and points to the case of the British Labour Party, which 
is, according to him, highly institutionalised while being organisationally and 
personally dependent on trade unions. Therefore, the suggested analytical 
framework does not separately operationalise the dimension of autonomy. 
The main reason for deciding not to include this dimension is that the impact 
of autonomy on the degree of institutionalisation is relatively unclear, as is shown 
in the theoretical part. It can be accepted that “[…] a way around these 
complexities is to specify the party’s need for a significant degree of decisional 
autonomy, or freedom from interference in determining its own policies 
and strategies” (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 14). In this sense, all three other 
dimensions include indicators strengthening a particular party’s position 
as an autonomous political actor (e.g. the number of changes of party leader, 
the ability to multiply the sources of party finance, or the number of members). 
As these variables indicate a party’s potential to build more formalised 
bureaucratic structures, the decisional autonomy is broadened as well, because 
these structures generally outweigh the influence of a particular leader or different 
external actors. 
The suggested index of party institutionalisation is composed of three 
dimensions, namely systemness, value infusion, and reification. Each dimension 
is operationalised by three indicators. As Randall and Svåsand (2002) do not 
provide a set of operational criteria, it is necessary to define them anew. Where 
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possible, the analysis relies on the operationalisation by Basedau and Stroh (2008), 
because their study provides the most comprehensive set of indicators. 
The dimension of systemness should reflect the degree of organisational 
development and stability. Randall and Svåsand (2002: 13) mention the ability 
of a political party to increase the scope, density and regularity of intra-party 
interactions. Systemness, which could primarily reflect the routinisation of intra-
party processes, is indicated by three variables. The first is the age of a political 
party, because according to criteria suggested by Huntington (1968: 13-15) 
and Dix (1992: 491) it can be hypothesised that the longer a political party exists, 
the more formalised internal structures it creates and the more effective patterns 
of behaviour it establishes. The next indicator is the absolute number of changes 
of party leader, as a successful change in leadership requires the setting of formal 
rules for intra-party electoral process and also strengthens the political party 
as a structure regardless of which personalities are involved (Basedau and Stroh 
2008: 12). The third indicator based on Panebianco (1988) evaluates whether 
a political party is able to differentiate its financial resources or depends rather 
on a single source, e.g. state subventions or sponsorship.4 The differentiation 
is operationalised as a reversed value of the Gini coefficient (Zeileis 2014) 
calculated from the proportions of all categories of income reported by political 
parties. The reversed coefficient ranges from zero, which means all party income 
comes from a single category, to one, which indicates that party income is equally 
distributed among all lawful possibilities. 
Value infusion “[…] refers to the extent to which party actors and supporters 
(whether or not falling into a more formalised category of membership) acquire 
an identification with and commitment to the party which transcend more 
instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement” (Randall and Svåsand 
2002: 13). Value infusion is thus measured by three variables. The first 
is characterised by party membership as a percentage of the overall electorate for 
the whole country (Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2013: 4). The second variable refers to the 
stability of the parliamentary organisation and measures the percentage 
of deputies who left the parliamentary group in the analysed electoral term 
(Basedau and Stroh 2008: 12). To cover less formalised categories of supporters, 
the third variable indicates the percentage of respondents who identify strongly 
with a particular political party5 (Basedau and Stroh 2008: 12).  
Reification reflects how the political party is grounded in the public 
imagination and to what extent other actors in the political system perceive 
the party as taken-for-granted (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 14). The first indicator 
                                                 
4 For further details about party funding in the Czech Republic see (Haughton 2014). 
5 CSES data used for 2006 and 2010, cross tabulation of variables C3020_3: Q20B. WHICH 
PARTY DO YOU FEEL CLOSEST TO and C3020_4: Q20C. DEGREE OF CLOSENESS 
TO THIS PARTY, missing values removed. CVVM data used for 2013, cross tabulation 
of variables PV.4 and PV.112, missing values removed. 
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is the stability of electoral support between the last and the second last general 
election, operationalised as the average loss or gain in both percentage 
and percentage points (in order to cover both the absolute and relative changes, 
as these are important for a more precise description of the wider context 
of political support; see Basedau and Stroh 2008: 12–13). The second indicator 
refers to the identification of voters with a particular political party  
(Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2013: 4). Based on survey data, the percentage of respondents 
identifying with a particular political party indicates its ability to keep support 
outside of electoral campaigns. The last variable measures the absolute number 
of organisational mergers and splits occurring during the analysed electoral term, 
because such organisational changes represent a serious obstacle to building 
a distinct party identity that is recognised by the electorate, other political parties, 
and political institutions (Janda 1980: 24). Splits are counted regardless of the size 
of the group changing its party membership, as the indicator should mainly reflect 
the role of publicly known party elites in the external dimension of party 
institutionalisation.  
All defined variables are normalised to a scale from zero to one using the 
“min-max”6 procedure. The advantages of this procedure are that differently 
measured variables can be compared, that all are evenly weighted in the resulting 
index, and that setting arbitrary thresholds is not necessary. On the other hand, 
the value of the index is strictly tied to analysed empirical cases and refers 
to differences among them. Thus, values resulting from two different datasets 
are not directly comparable; therefore, those datasets would have to be merged. 
Also it should be mentioned that potential outliers could cause distortion 
in the transformed indicators. 
4. Data 
The data used for analysis were collected from different sources. For indicators 
relating to party funding, the database politickefinance.cz collected by the  
NGO Center of Applied Economics affiliated with the Institute of Economic 
Studies at Charles University in Prague served as the main source. The database 
contains digitalised data from annual financial reports on political parties in the 
Czech Republic from 2006 to 2014 (Politické Finance 2014). 
Electoral results including registers of candidates are accessible in the 
database of the Czech Statistical Office (Český statistický úřad 2015). For more 
frequent observations of public support, data from the CVVM polling agency 
on party preferences were also used. The data are accessible on-line via the Czech 
Social Science Data Archive (CVVM 2014). 
                                                 
6 Min-Max normalises variables by subtracting the minimum value and dividing by the range of the 
variable values. 𝑣 =
𝑥𝑖 − min 𝑥
max 𝑥 − min 𝑥
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Individual level data on attitudes towards political parties are cited from 
The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2013) for the years 2006 
and 2010. The year 2013 is analysed using data from the “Naše společnost” Czech 
opinion polls conducted by CVVM in 2014. Both surveys use a very common 
concept of party identification, in which the degree of closeness to a political party 
is scaled to three categories – very close, somewhat close, and not very close; thus, 
the recoding of values was not necessary. Different wording is used 
in the question on which party respondents support. In CSES the question 
is “Which party do you feel closest to?”, but in the CVVM survey it is “If the 
General Election was taking place today, who would you vote for?”. 
Data on changes in membership of parliamentary groups for all electoral 
terms are accessible from the archives of The Chamber of Deputies 
of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. 
Besides publicly known information from media monitoring, data on internal 
party structure and party membership were collected on a continual basis using 
techniques based on field research strategies such as the observation of party 
conferences and semi-structured interviews of party members or party staff. 
For analysis, the data were managed in long format, so cases are defined 
as political party ‘x’ in time ‘t’. This procedure was applied to increase 
N, to increase the variability among values in order to demonstrate the effects 
of normalisation techniques (see above), and to analyse institutionalisation over 
time. Missing data occurring in the case of political parties with just one electoral 
participation (VV, ANO, ÚSVIT) or parties facing discontinuity in parliamentary 
representation (KDU-ČSL, SZ) were omitted from the calculations. 
As the analysis deals with the success of genuinely new political parties, 
it should be noted that data for the electoral term 2013 are still incomplete. The 
article benefits from including the last electoral term mainly because it provides an 
opportunity to put into context the significant electoral gains of the political 
movement ANO. It is also useful to observe the development of newcomers 
from 2010, mainly the internal consolidation of TOP 09. 
5. Systemness 
Regarding financial resources, political parties in the Czech Republic have several 
possibilities with respect to differentiating their incomes. Besides state 
subventions, donations, and member’s contributions, Czech parties can profit 
from cultural and publishing activities or renting property. In total there are 
11 funding options. According to annual reports, political parties rely 
predominantly on state subventions and private donations. Contributions 
by members are more significant in the case of parties with larger memberships, 
e.g. KSČM, KDU-ČSL, ODS and ČSSD. Especially in the case of new political 
parties, it is common for party elites to invest their own private funds in the 
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formative period before electoral success. This can be illustrated in the case 
of ANO. In 2012, donations to ANO amounted to 63 981 964 CZK representing 
99.88 % of its annual income, and almost 90 % of such donations were provided 
by Andrej Babiš, party founder and leader, or by different companies associated 
with Agrofert Holding, of which Andrej Babiš is the owner.  
Measured by the gini coefficient (see Table 3), better differentiation 
of incomes is characteristic of parties with a developed membership structure and 
some kind of organisational continuity with previous historical subjects, 
e.g. KDU-ČSL. In contrast, new political parties often rely on a single source, 
mainly private donations before electoral breakthrough, after which donations 
are partly replaced by state subventions. Thus, there is no clear linear relationship 
between electoral gains and the differentiation of resources, yet a higher degree 
of differentiation supports party stability in the case of unpredictable 
organisational shock, such as a temporary reduction in state subventions caused 
by a decrease in votes. 
Table 3: Indicators of Systemness 
Party Year Financial Resources 
Structure* 
Leadership 
Alternations** 
ČSSD 2006 0.44 5 
KDU-ČSL 2006 0.43 3 
KSČM 2006 0.35 3 
ODS 2006 0.40 1 
SZ 2006 0.20 7 
ČSSD 2010 0.36 5 
KDU-ČSL 2010 0.45 5 
KSČM 2010 0.38 3 
ODS 2010 0.39 2 
SZ 2010 0.29 8 
TOP 09 2010 0.27 0 
VV 2010 0.26 3 
ANO 2013 0.25 0 
ČSSD 2013 0.34 6 
KDU-ČSL 2013 0.46 6 
KSČM 2013 0.36 3 
ODS 2013 0.44 3 
SZ 2013 0.23 8 
TOP 09 2013 0.32 0 
ÚSVIT 2013 0.14 0 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
* Reversed value of gini coefficient, interval [0:1] where 1 means the most even distribution 
among categories. Based on data (Politické finance 2014). 
** Total number of changes at the position of party leader until the date of general election. 
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Successful alternation in leadership can be considered as one of the strongest 
indicators of institutionalisation, because it indicates a party’s sustainability 
without reference to the influence of a particular leader. The collected data show 
that political parties with historical backgrounds were not the only ones able 
to repeatedly change their leaders, e.g. VV underwent three alternations before its 
electoral success in 2010. Nevertheless, the third change represented a deep 
organisational change because it occurred on the back of a pragmatic decision 
to achieve success in the general election. The result was the appointment 
of a publicly known writer and investigative journalist, Radek John, as the party 
leader, however without him having real power to organise the internal 
functioning of the party itself. Further changes in leadership following certain 
controversies suggest that the party’s subsequent marginalisation in terms 
of electoral support occurred because it did not have a publicly known 
and accepted leader, although it possibly achieved a higher degree of systemness. 
 
Figure 1: Dimension of Systemness 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
With respect to systemness (see Figure 1), it is possible to divide the analysed 
political parties into two groups. The first group consists of parties established 
in the 90’s in the context of democratic transition. These parties tend to perform 
better in the differentiation of financial resources and have undergone several 
alternations in leadership. The group of new political parties is characterised 
by recent formation before an election. The financial resources of these new 
political parties also tend to have a less differentiated structure. Furthermore, one 
of the most typical characteristics is strong personalisation, i.e. when new party 
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is formed around a certain leader. Although the VV party achieves a higher score 
in comparison with other new parties, as it was established already in 2002, it only 
nominated candidates and succeeded in first-order election in 2010, after deep 
organisational changes resulted in an end to changes of party leaders. 
 
6. Value Infusion 
Comparison with other European countries shows that total party membership 
in the Czech Republic is among the lowest (Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 
2012). Two parties, KSČM and KDU-ČSL, constitute an exception with respect 
to membership structure, which partly refers to the mass organisation of the 
former Communist party and the ČSL party as its “satellite” within the 
communist-controlled National Front. As can be seen in Table 4, both parties 
have relatively high membership densities, which means that a significant 
proportion of voters are recruited form party members. Nevertheless, both parties 
have faced a substantial decline in membership. This trend can support 
organisational changes in the direction of a more professionalised leadership, 
or the externalisation of electoral campaigns (Polás ̌ek, Novotný and Perottino 
2012).  
New political parties can be located at opposite extremes of the spectrum. 
The membership of such parties is very rudimental and they are mainly organised 
as electoral vehicles formed around a particular leader. Instead of building 
a formal membership organisation, new parties try to mobilise their supporters 
using less formalised communication channels. From 2009 to 2011, VV practiced 
an organisational model in which registered supporters were given the option 
to participate in referenda formulating political priorities and even to choose the 
party leader in a direct election. ANO and ÚSVIT preferred more professionally 
managed communication with supporters on social networks. These new parties 
also differ significantly from longer established small parties, e.g. SZ, by their high 
electoral support. It should also be noted that the claim concerning low levels 
of membership which are observable in the cases of new political parties still 
applies, even in comparison with the period of transition to democracy when 
some of the analysed parties were established (ODS) or renewed (ČSSD). 
Immediately after being recreated, ČSSD claimed to have 10 785 members 
in 1990, and ODS even reported 18 557 members in 1992, just one year after 
its establishment (Linek and Pecháček 2007: 262). 
The next fact observable in the context of Czech parties is the volatile 
character of membership, which is connected with conjunctural trends in electoral 
support and temporary success. This is the most visible in the case of ODS, which 
played the role of the largest right-wing party until the election in 2013, but, 
as a result of political scandals, faced a sharp decline in electoral support and also 
in membership. While in 2010 ODS reported 31 011 members, in 2013 
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membership was down to 21 591, and the last report released in 2015 showed 
membership had further declined to 14 771. 
 
Table 4: Party membership in the Czech Republic 
Party Year Total membership M/E* M/V** 
ČSSD 2006 17000 0.317818 0.983326 
KDU-ČSL 2006 42504 0.794619 10.9913 
KSČM 2006 88081 1.646689 12.85239 
ODS 2006 26155 0.488972 1.382053 
SZ 2006 2000 0.03739 0.594377 
ČSSD 2010 24486 0.468107 2.11951 
KDU-ČSL 2010 34875 0.666716 15.18172 
KSČM 2010 66627 1.27373 11.29721 
ODS 2010 31011 0.592847 2.931673 
SZ 2010 1500 0.028676 1.173424 
TOP 09 2010 1700 0.032499 0.194545 
VV 2010 1683 0.032174 0.295716 
ANO 2013 713 0.014346 0.076895 
ČSSD 2013 23613 0.475112 2.322219 
KDU-ČSL 2013 29976 0.603141 8.895747 
KSČM 2013 53500 1.076462 7.219544 
ODS 2013 21591 0.434428 5.62011 
SZ 2013 1397 0.028109 0.878478 
TOP 09 2013 3811 0.07668 0.639047 
ÚSVIT 2013 9 0.000181 0.002629 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
* Membership of parties in relation to total electorate. 
** Membership of parties in relation to number of voters of a given party. 
 
On the basis of survey data (see Table 5), it appears that the ability to attract 
a stable body of supporters exhibiting high identification with the respective party 
is predominantly tied to parties with larger organisational inertia, namely KSČM 
and KDU-ČSL. About 20 % of respondents who identified with KSČM or  
KDU-ČSL also declared themselves to be very close to the party. Only one other 
party was able to exceed the 20% mark: namely, more than 22 % of supporters 
felt very close to the political movement ÚSVIT in 2013. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable whether this is the beginning of a trend; the party was formed 
around the popular political leader Tomio Okamura and at the time of survey it 
had just nine formal members. Thus, it seems probable that the majority of 
support was connected with the leader’s personality and not with loyalty to a 
certain political organisation. 
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Table 5: Percentage of respondents reporting “very close” identification with 
given political party 
 
2006 2010 2013 
ODS 14.39 6.25 7.7 
KDU-ČSL 18.67 21.62 27.8 
ČSSD 5.9 5.88 10.9 
SZ 5.94 11.11 11.1 
KSČM 26.54 24.79 27.7 
TOP 09 - 7.5 1.9 
VV - 12.87 - 
ÚSVIT - - 22.2 
ANO - - 6.6 
Source: Author’s own calculations; Data: 2006 and 2010 CSES module 3, 2013 CVVM 
Naše společnost. 
 
Figure 2 shows the averages of normalised values in three consecutive 
elections. The party with the highest degree of value infusion is KSČM, which 
is primarily a result of the fact that it still profits from the largest membership, 
a highly stable and disciplined parliamentary organisation, and a specific base 
of supporters declaring themselves to be very close to the party. KDU-ČSL 
differs from KSČM mainly in the sense that it underwent an organisational split 
in 2009 and part of its deputies became independent. The score for KDU-ČSL 
is also further reduced, because it failed to gain parliamentary representation 
in 2010. The two main opposing parties, ODS and ČSSD, are located in the 
middle of the spectrum. This is primarily the result of somewhat similar 
characteristics with respect to membership, a generally moderate level 
of supporter identification, and minor defections from parliamentary groups.  
New political parties perform slightly worse than established parties, mainly 
because of their small memberships and also moderate levels of identification. 
The score for VV is further reduced by the disintegration of the parliamentary 
group. The only exception is SZ, which has older organisational subjectivity; 
however, it is classified as the party with almost the lowest level of value infusion. 
The reason for this classification is a combination of moderate supporter 
identification, small membership, and the fact that it underwent two electoral 
terms (2010 and 2013) without parliamentary representation. 
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Figure 2: Dimension of Value Infusion 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
7. Reification 
The degree of reification is mainly influenced by the degree of general support for 
a certain party. Thus, it seems difficult to find concrete patterns or trends 
(see Figure 3). In the case of ODS, continuous decline caused by decreasing 
electoral gains and identification can be seen. The low scores for VV in 2010 and 
ÚSVIT in 2013 are related to their organisational and personal instability, which 
arose after successful electoral breakthroughs. In both cases, the parliamentary 
groups split shortly after the election and some members immediately established 
new parties. The first split in VV occurred after the 2012 crisis in the  
ODS–TOP 09–VV coalition government, when some deputies left the party and 
founded the new political subject LIDEM, which replaced VV in the coalition. 
Despite having nine formal members, ÚSVIT split after internal disputes over 
party finances. In this case, the popular party leader Tomio Okamura left ÚSVIT 
and established the new political party SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy). 
Such a lack of organisational inertia is not, however, a general reason for 
a low degree of reification. The significant exception seems to be the case 
of ANO, which received high electoral support despite being established just one 
year before the 2013 general election. In addition, ANO has not faced 
organisational discontinuities. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the success 
of ANO is connected with personalised leadership and that the party benefits 
from extensive use of advanced marketing techniques. On the other hand, the 
party has not fully developed an extra-parliamentary organisational structure. 
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Among parties with higher degrees of reification, the most serious decline 
in this dimension of institutionalisation occurred in the case of ODS. This was 
primarily the result of continually increasing electoral volatility between 
the elections in 2006 and 2013. While in 2006 ODS gained 35.4 % of the votes, 
in 2010 it received only 20.2 %. The decline further continued in 2013, when 
the party recorded its worst ever electoral result, receiving just 7.7 % of the vote. 
The same trend is observable in party identification. 
A quite opposite trend was expressed by SZ. In this case, increasing 
reification was to a large extent caused by the stabilisation of electoral support. 
In fact, the high level of electoral volatility in 2006 was connected with 
exceptional electoral gains. Thus, two subsequent elections rather represented 
a return to the previous level of electoral support. Furthermore, SZ faced minor 
organisational splits in the periods of 2006–2010 and 2010–2013, which also 
contributed to a lower resulting score. 
Putting the KDU-ČSL and its organisational split, TOP 09, under 
comparison, it can be seen that despite achieving a lower score in systemness and 
value infusion, TOP 09 performed better in terms of reification, the new party 
achieving a slightly lower degree of electoral volatility and a higher degree 
of identification. 
In general, the dimension of reification, as an indicator of party rootedness 
as regards its relations with other actors within the political system, seems 
to correlate little with internal dimensions – particularly in the sense that parties 
without a stabilised formal organisational structure are able to attract a significant 
proportion of the electorate, although their position is relatively weak 
in comparison with more organisationally institutionalised parties. Due to splits 
and overall internal instability, these new parties are less reified as reliable and 
persistent actors with respect to other political institutions. 
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Figure 3: Dimension of Reification 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
8. Party Institutionalisation 
Summarising the three presented dimensions, the index ascribes a higher 
classification to those political parties with a more developed organisational 
structure and distinctive ideological profile (see Table 6). In the role 
of challengers, new parties are able to attract a high proportion of the electorate 
using advanced techniques of political marketing, but they seem to be highly 
vulnerable in the context of internal controversies, which leads to a loss of public 
trust. In this sense, organisation-based institutionalisation produces more stable 
political parties due to the fact that potential internal problems are tied 
to particular persons and do not influence party identity as a whole. 
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Table 6: Political Party Institutionalisation Index 
Party Year 
Party 
Institutionalisation 
Index Systemness 
Value 
Infusion Reification 
ČSSD 2006 0.73 0.86 0.41 0.92 
KDU-ČSL 2006 0.59 0.77 0.52 0.49 
KSČM 2006 0.81 0.68 0.98 0.77 
ODS 2006 0.70 0.63 0.57 0.89 
SZ 2006 0.37 0.68 0.19 0.24 
ČSSD 2010 0.63 0.77 0.45 0.68 
KDU-ČSL 2010 0.71 0.87 0.58 0.64 
KSČM 2010 0.79 0.71 0.89 0.77 
ODS 2010 0.63 0.67 0.45 0.76 
SZ 2010 0.52 0.82 0.19 0.43 
TOP 09 2010 0.39 0.15 0.41 0.72 
VV 2010 0.23 0.38 0.15 0.13 
ANO 2013 0.41 0.12 0.4 0.85 
ČSSD 2013 0.74 0.79 0.55 0.88 
KDU-ČSL 2013 0.78 0.92 0.79 0.64 
KSČM 2013 0.77 0.68 0.88 0.74 
ODS 2013 0.62 0.76 0.5 0.62 
SZ 2013 0.57 0.76 0.19 0.65 
TOP 09 2013 0.43 0.24 0.35 0.69 
ÚSVIT 2013 0.20 0 0.37 0.25 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
Note: Reliability test (Cronbach alpha = 0.73) across all variables suggests that they are 
components of single scale. That is, variables together measure the same theoretical concept. 
From a long-term perspective, the key variable influencing organisational 
stability is how a political party with a strong leader approaches the situation 
of alternation, because “[a] leader can socialise people who operate in public into 
certain values. This process, if successful, will lead to a form of group attachment 
that transcends to a specific leader as an individual” (Bolleyer 2013: 58). Indeed, 
this development can be seen partially in the case of ODS. ODS was established 
by Václav Klaus in 1991 as one of the successors of Civic Forum (OF), the main 
actor of democratic transition in the Czech Republic. The party’s electoral success 
and further institutionalisation were, to a large extent, based on Klaus’ popularity, 
and the first alternation occurred after more than 10 years of the party’s existence. 
So, despite its previous leadership-oriented pattern of institutionalisation, ODS 
has become institutionalised as a more organisation-based political party in the 
context of several alternations, party membership, or the differentiation of 
financial resources. In this sense, the main prerequisites for long-term 
sustainability and potential organisational change with respect to leadership- 
-oriented parties seem to be a sufficient amount of time for the party founder 
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to internalise the leader’s values as basic party principles and at least a moderately 
well-developed level of extra-parliamentary organisation. 
Regarding stability across all dimensions, KSČM should be classified as highly 
institutionalised (see Figure 4), because, in spite of the continual decrease in its 
membership, not only is it still capable of sustaining one of the most developed 
extra-parliamentary organisations in the Czech Republic, but it is also supported 
by a relatively stable group in the electorate exhibiting strong identification with 
the party. This probably results from the fact that the party did no undergo deeper 
organisational reforms after the transition to democracy and, to a large extent, 
base their support on voters dissatisfied with the political, social and economic 
changes after 1989. 
In the context of the 2013 election, the trend of increasing institutionalisation 
can be seen in the case of KDU-ČSL. The lower score it received in the previous 
election was mainly connected with a lower overall level of electoral support, as 
electoral gains by KDU-ČSL varied at around the 5 % threshold, and with internal 
disputes resulting in an organisational split and the establishment of the electorally 
successful party TOP 09. Compared to VV, TOP 09 seems to be institutionally 
stabilised at a particular level, because it was able to sustain electoral support in 
2013, after participating in the governing coalition. The party is also 
organisationally stable in terms of its parliamentary organisation. Two challenges 
facing the future development of TOP 09 are alternation in leadership, which will 
probably be necessary in the near future, and potential limitations on cooperation 
with the political movement Mayors and Independents (STAN). 
 
Figure 4: Institutionalisation in terms of three analysed dimensions 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Figure 4 above provides a multidimensional perspective on party 
institutionalisation in the Czech Republic. It shows two different clusters 
of political parties, distinguished by their overall level of systemness. The first 
consists of so-called “old” political parties with a stabilised role in the party 
system. They are mostly distinguished by their higher level of systemness, not only 
as a result of chronological age, but also as a result of their better ability 
to differentiate financial resources and to successfully alternate their leadership. 
With respect to value infusion, greater variability is observed. KDU-ČSL and 
KSČM benefit from a larger membership base and strongly identified supporters. 
In contrast, the lower score achieved by SZ is the result not only of its smaller 
membership and of the fact that it lost its representation in the lower house, 
but also of the particularly small number of its supporters that exhibit strong 
identification with the party. 
The second cluster includes new political parties electorally successful in the 
context of the last two electoral terms. The interpretation is consistent with 
Bolleyer’s (2013) hypothesis about different sources of institutionalisation. 
Particularly in the case of TOP 09, which achieved re-election after its electoral 
breakthrough in 2010, it can be seen that a significant degree of systemness is not 
a necessary condition for achieving higher degrees of value infusion 
and reification. From preliminary data on ANO, the same logic can be identified. 
Nevertheless, as seen in the cases of VV and ÚSVIT, a small degree of systemness 
leads to a party’s higher vulnerability in the face of organisational shocks. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The article proposes a new composite indicator of party institutionalisation 
enabling a more systematic comparative analysis of political parties 
to be conducted. On the basis of empirical data, it provides an interpretation 
of how a certain pattern of institutionalisation can influence persistence in the 
party system. Data on parties in the Czech Republic show that institutionalisation 
can be operationalised and interpreted as a single linear variable, measurable 
in absolute values. Furthermore, this approach yields results with a satisfactory 
level of significance, as shown by the applied test of reliability; thus, Levitsky’s 
(1998) argument is weakened. In fact, combining different aspects 
of institutionalisation empirically supports the theoretical assumption that these 
dimensions are parts of one broader phenomenon. However, every composite 
indicator measuring a multidimensional theoretical concept should also 
be unpacked and the dimensions discussed separately, because it provides a more 
complex picture of reality. The presented index is useful in terms of comparative 
analysis, as it helps to interpret the highly complex phenomenon 
of institutionalisation in a more easily understandable way.  
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In organisational terms, the analysed political parties are divided into two 
distinct groups. The first group consists of political parties existing since 
the transition to democracy and is characterised by long term stability in most 
of the measured indicators. Significant internal sources of institutionalisation can 
serve as stabilisation factors against external shocks – in particular, losing 
parliamentary representation for one or more electoral terms or even 
organisational splits. This can be clearly seen in the cases of KDU-ČSL and SZ. 
Thus, a higher degree of institutionalisation does not automatically lead to higher 
electoral gains, but rather supports the survival of the organisation as such 
regardless contemporary obstacles.  
The usefulness of the concept lies in its ability to analyse complex relations 
among the levels at which political parties operate, namely how combinations 
of internal and external sources of institutionalisation generate specific 
organisational patterns. Thus, in further research, it would be fruitful to analyse 
whether and to what extent political parties without long-term organisational 
continuity in newly-formed party systems would reach sustainable positions in the 
system without deeper organisational changes, i.e. without building stronger extra-
parliamentary structures, these functionally replaced by professional advisors and 
experts. The presented analytic framework could also be used for large-N 
comparative research designs in order to understand regional differentiation in the 
development and stability of political parties after the transition to democracy 
in CEE or to further explain differences in the functioning of political parties 
in new and old party systems, because it is still unclear whether parties in new 
democracies remain organisationally different from their counterparts in old 
democracies or whether a significant degree of convergence occurred during 
the development of democracy in post-communist countries. 
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